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Synesthesia literally means a “union of the 
senses” whereby two or more of the five senses that 
are normally experienced separately are involuntarily 
and automatically joined together in experience (1, 2, 
3). For example, some synesthetes experience a 
color when they hear a sound, although many 
instances of synesthesia also occur entirely within 
the visual sense.  In this paper, I first mainly engage 
critically with Sollberger’s view that there is reason to 
think that at least some synesthetic experiences can 
be viewed as truly veridical perceptions, and not as 
illusions or hallucinations (4). Among other things, I 
explore the possibility that many forms of synesthesia 
can be understood as experiencing what I will call 
“second-order secondary properties,” that is, 
experiences of properties of objects induced by the 
secondary qualities of those objects.  In doing so, I 
shed some light on why synesthesia is typically one-
directional and its relation to some 
psychopathologies such as autism. 
2. INTRODUCTION
Synesthesia is the “union of the senses” 
whereby two or more of the five senses that are 
normally experienced separately are involuntarily 
and automatically joined together in experience (1, 2, 
3). For example, some synesthetes experience a 
color when they hear a sound, although many 
instances of synesthesia also occur entirely within 
the visual sense.  After making some preliminary 
distinctions, I first engage critically with Sollberger’s 
view that there is reason to think that at least some 
synesthetic experiences can be viewed as veridical 
perceptions, and not as illusions or hallucinations (4). 
I also explore the possibility that many forms of 
synesthesia can be understood as experiencing what 
I will call “second-order secondary properties,” that is, 
experiences of properties or qualities of objects 
induced by the secondary qualities of those 
objects.  Finally, I shed light on why synesthesia is 
virtually always one-directional and its relation to 
some psychopathologies such as autism. 
3. SYNESTHESIA
Synesthesia or, what we might call 
synesthetic experiences, often involves instances 
where two or more of the five senses that are 
normally experienced separately are involuntarily 
and automatically joined together in experience (1, 
2). For example, some synesthetes experience a 
color when they hear a sound or see a letter. 
However, synesthesia can occur entirely within one 
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sense, for example, “grapheme-color synesthesia,” 
the most common form of synesthesia, involves 
experiencing (black) letters or numerals as inherently 
colored. For example, one might always experience 
the letter “R” or the numeral “2” as red, or the letter 
“N” and the numeral “8” as purple. All letters and 
numerals are experienced as having clearly distinct 
and regular colors. Others experience tastes, smells, 
shapes, or touches in almost any combination. These 
sensations are automatic and cannot be turned on or 
off.  
Motion-sound synesthesia involves hearing 
sounds in response to visual motion and flickers. 
Saenz and Koch report evidence that, for at least four 
synesthetes, seeing visual motion or non-moving 
visual flashes automatically causes the experience of 
sound (5). These synesthetes outperformed control 
subjects on a difficult visual task involving rhythmic 
temporal patterns, for example, judging whether two 
successive sequences (either both auditory or both 
visual) were the same or different. This is presumably 
because these synesthetes not only see but also 
hear the patterns. Unlike many other abnormal 
psychological phenomena, however, synesthesia is 
not a disease or illness and is typically not harmful. In 
fact, the vast majority of synesthetes prefer to have 
synesthesia and could not imagine life without it 
(though there are some exceptions as we will see 
later). Synesthesia can, for example, aid one’s 
memory of names and phone numbers and be an 
asset for creative art. Still, what “it is like” to be a 
synesthete must be quite different than most of our 
“normal” conscious experience. In a sense, we might 
say that they experience an enhanced form of 
conscious experience as opposed to the typical 
disorder, that is, something is added to conscious 
experience instead of the more typical subtraction. 
Several key terms and distinctions are 
important to note at the outset: 
1. Grossenbacher and Lovelace use the 
terms ‘‘inducer’’ to refer to the stimulus that triggers 
the synesthesia and ‘‘concurrent’’ to refer to the 
synesthetically induced sensory attributes (6). 
Synesthetic experiences are highly idiosyncratic and 
individualized, that is, no two people’s set of 
synesthetic experiences seem to be exactly the 
same.  
2. There are so-called “higher” versus 
“lower” synesthetes in grapheme-color synesthesia 
(1, 7). Higher synesthesia is much more common and 
has to with the “meaning” or “concept” of grapheme, 
that is, the concept inherent in a grapheme that 
induces color, not the visual shape itself.  Letter 
capitalization and font size generally do not change 
an induced color.  For example, J, j, and J evoke the 
same color experience. Lower synesthesia is rare 
whereby the inducer is the visual shape itself. 
3. Another central distinction is between 
“projectors” and “associators” in grapheme color 
synesthesia (8). The concurrent images are either 
projected onto the external world (projector 
synesthesia) or perceived in the mind’s eye 
(associator synesthesia). In projector synesthesia, 
the projected concurrent may be seen as 
instantiated like non-synesthetic colors, as floating 
above its inducer, or even as an ‘afterimage’ that 
floats close to the subject’s eyes. In associator 
synesthesia, the concurrent image is seen 
internally, much like a visual image retrieved from 
memory or generated by imagination. It is worth 
mentioning, however, that Cytowic and Eagleman 
find this distinction inadequate partly because some 
concurrent color locations need not be right on the 
grapheme itself (7).  Thus they prefer to distinguish 
between “localizer” and “nonlocalizer” where the 
former involves experiencing synesthetic colors 
belong to a specific location (whether or not it is on 
the inducer or grapheme) and the latter refers to 
those synesthetic color experiences with no specific 
location.  
There is significant empirical evidence for 
the view that synesthetic experiences are perceptual 
in the sense that they are genuinely experienced as 
properties of objects.  For example, it has been 
shown that grapheme-color synesthetes can 
perceptually group graphemes according to their 
synesthetic colors (9). Neuroimaging studies from 
Nunn and colleagues have shown similar brain 
activation in synesthetes as found in typical non-
synesthetic color processing (10). 
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One explanation for this kind of synesthesia 
is that there is “cross-activation” or “cross-wiring” of 
adjacent brain regions (1). The normal lack of overlap 
and integration between the brain regions is absent:  
“The fusiform gyrus (in the temporal lobes) 
contains the color area V4 … which processes color 
information, but … the number area of the brain, 
which represents visual numbers …, is right next to it 
… (and) imaging experiments on people with 
synesthesia suggest that showing black and white 
numbers to a synesthete produces activation in the 
color area ….” (11, p. 65).  
There is thus a kind of neural 
“hyperconnectivity” in these synesthetes not found in 
other people. Other related neural explanations 
appeal to “disinhibited cortical feedback” between 
brain areas such that information is processed in a 
bottom-up fashion but also that later stage brain 
activation feeds back to activate earlier stages. It is 
this abnormal feedback that causes the unusual 
synesthetic experiences (6).  Cytowic and Eagleman 
explain the neural differences between higher and 
lower synesthetes by pointing out how different brain 
areas cross-activate with V4 which is the primary 
color area in the visual cortex (7).  For higher 
synesthetes, V4 cross-activates with the anterior 
inferior temporal (AIT) cortex which processes 
conceptual representations of words, letters, and 
numbers.  For lower synesthetes, V4 cross-activates 
with the visual word form area (VWFA) in the fusiform 
gyrus which responds to visually presented words, 
letters, and numbers. 
4. SYNESTHESIA AND HALLUCINATION 
The relationship between synesthesia 
and hallucination is an interesting one. Is 
synesthesia a special kind of hallucination or are 
synesthetic experiences perceptually veridical in 
some way? I will mainly focus on Sollberger’s 
discussion since it is an in-depth treatment of the 
issue (4). He aims to show that “there is reason to 
think that at least some synesthetic experiences 
can be viewed as truly veridical perceptions, and 
not as illusions or hallucinations” (4, p. 171). He 
mainly focuses on “…a sub-group of synesthetes 
who meet the following two conditions: (a) They 
literally attribute the sensory properties of the 
synesthetic experiences to the distal stimulus itself 
(and) (b) They do not take their synesthetic 
experiences to be nonveridical, e.g. illusory or 
hallucinatory. This means that the following 
question not only makes sense but is most often 
answered in the affirmative by such synesthetes: 
For any synesthetically evoked sensory property F 
that the distal physical object x appears to have, 
does x really have F?” (4, p. 173).  This would 
certainly be the case for projector grapheme-color 
synesthesia.  He also cites an interesting case 
described by Cytowic (12, p. 13): “I remember 
most accurately scents. We were preparing to 
move into the house I grew up in. I remember at 
age 2 my father was on a ladder painting the left 
side of the wall. The paint smelled blue (emphasis 
added), although he was painting it white. I 
remember to this day thinking why the paint was 
white, when it smelled blue.”  
Sollberger offers and defends three 
reasons for treating synesthetic experiences as truly 
veridical perceptions:  
1. “synesthesia enhances several cognitive 
and perceptual capacities in its bearer. The additional 
synesthetic sense can enhance the abilities of 
reading, writing and spelling and it can also expand 
the memory faculties (p. 174)…the fact that 
synesthesia is not a disabling or dysfunctional 
biological trait, but a condition that can indeed benefit 
the possessor’s cognition and perception, opens up 
space for considering synesthetic experiences as 
potentially veridical perceptions” (4, p. 175). 
2. “…the subjective reports of synesthetes 
[show that they] are firmly convinced that what they 
synesthetically perceive is real and ‘‘valid,’’ and not 
hallucinatory or illusory” (4, p. 175). 
3. “…from a purely evolutionary 
perspective, the goal of perception is to maximize 
fitness, i.e., to raise more offspring. Perception must 
be viewed as a niche- and problem-specific cognitive 
function whose purpose is to enhance fitness. 
Pertinently, the perceiver is able to survive and 
reproduce only if she can successfully interact with 
the world” (4, p. 175). 
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Sollberger carefully considers several 
objections to each of the above reasons and then 
offers further counter-replies. I won’t delve deeply 
into each objections or counter-reply but, for 
example, he considers and rejects the notion that we 
should not take reports of most synesthetes at face 
value. Although I largely agree with Sollberger 
regarding the plausibility of the above three claims, I 
wish to critically elaborate on some of them and other 
points raised in his paper. He does concede that 
some synesthetes probably do not really take some 
concurrents to be properties of the distal objects (e.g. 
that numbers really have personality traits or 
genders) but he reiterates that he is not claiming that 
all synesthetes are the same in this respect.  Still, he 
insists that we should not think of synesthetic 
experiences as involving some special kind of 
hallucination. He warns against being overly 
dismissive of what is experientially possible with 
respect to the following options (4, p. 178): 
(A) Strong actual reading: the synesthetic 
concurrents appear to the synesthete as properties 
of the distal object x. 
(B) Strong possible reading: it is possible that the 
synesthetic concurrents appear to the synesthete as 
properties of x. 
(C) Weak actual reading: the synesthetic concurrents 
appear to the synesthete as being bound in some 
way to x. 
Sollberger sees little reason to rule out 
cases of (A) and allow only for (C).  Some might 
suppose that we cannot make sense of (A): “That is, 
a skeptic might be tempted to rule out such cases a 
priori because she thinks that this kind of cross-modal 
property attribution is inconceivable and hence 
impossible.  Cases of (B) must eo ipso also be 
rejected by such a skeptic. What is odd about such a 
dismissive view about what is experientially possible 
is that it is far too narrow-minded” (4, p. 178).  Still, 
as Sollberger knows, there are cases of “associator” 
grapheme-color synesthesia which would seem to fit 
(C) better than (A) which, in turn, better describes 
“projector” grapheme-color synesthesia.  In some 
ways, Sollberger might simply be making a plausible 
overall case for the apparent truism that there is more 
than one coherent way to experience the same world 
of objects and properties.  However, as we will see 
below, the matter gets more complicated very 
quickly. 
Before going further, it will be useful to have 
a working definition of a hallucination.   On one view, 
it is “a percept-like experience which (a) occurs in the 
absence of appropriate stimulus, (b) has the full force 
or impact of the corresponding (real) perception, and 
(c) is not amenable to direct and voluntary control by 
the experiencer” (13, p. 23).  But this definition could 
characterize synesthesia in different ways.  Indeed, it 
is pretty clear that (b) and (c) are present in 
synesthetic experiences, as we have already 
seen.  The problem, however, might be with (a) and 
its specific use of the term “appropriate stimulus.” 
Presumably, this refers to something like the “normal” 
or “usual” stimulus for typical perceivers. But if this is 
so, then synesthetes are having hallucinatory 
experiences since they are not typical perceivers in 
this respect. If meeting the above three conditions is 
sufficient for having a hallucination, then it would thus 
seem that Sollberger’s view could be challenged on 
those grounds. Still, there seems to be something far 
more intrasubjectively stable, systematic, and 
reliable in the synesthete’s experience which is 
lacking in other random and momentary 
hallucinations. So we might suppose that 
synesthesia involves having some sort of regular 
perceptual “error” as long as it is a stable and 
systematic natural error. The stimuli in question are, 
we might say, “appropriate” or “normal” for the 
synesthete.  If they are hallucinations, they are at 
least different than those caused rarely and 
somewhat randomly by ingesting drugs or suffering 
from epilepsy.   
There also seems to be an ambiguity in the 
use of the term “appears” in the above readings (A) – 
(C).  In some cases, such as in projector grapheme-
color cases, the term ‘appears’ refers to the way the 
distal stimulus looks to the synesthete.  But, 
especially in other non-visual cases, such as color-
smells or sounds-taste synesthesia, the term 
‘appears’ seems to mean something more like 
“caused by” which is not quite the same.  That is, if 
the paint smells blue, is the claim that the paint 
causes me to experience a certain smell or am I 
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saying that the smell appears in the paint or as part 
of the paint somehow?  This sort of synesthesia 
seems at best to meet (C) above, that is, the week 
actual reading. Indeed, there is perhaps even a 
further ambiguity in the use of ‘appears.’ Consider 
another one of Sollberger’s examples:  
“The shapes are not distinct from hearing 
them - they are part of what hearing is. The 
vibraphone, the musical instrument, makes a round 
shape. Each is like a little gold ball falling. That’s what 
the sound is; it couldn’t possibly by anything else” 
(12, p. 69). 
This seems to be an example of sound-
vision synesthesia.  Is the concurrent (the shape) 
experienced as part of the synesthetic auditory 
experience?  It would seem so if we take the report 
at face value, especially in the first and fourth 
sentence in the quotation above.  However, the 
second sentence might be taken instead as reporting 
that the sound, or even the instrument itself, causes 
(“makes”) a round shape.  This seems more like the 
language of cause and effect.  So does the sound 
itself “appear” round or does it simply cause the 
synesthete to experience round shapes?  Perhaps 
even more difficult to understand, is the sound itself 
round in some sense?   
So the case for treating synesthetic 
experiences as hallucinations is perhaps somewhat 
stronger than Sollberger claims according to the 
above definition, especially if we interpret the 
“appropriate stimulus” as the normal stimulus for a 
typical perceiver. It is worth noting that the official 
“American Psychological Association” dictionary 
definition of a hallucination is not necessarily very 
helpful here.  According to it, a hallucination is a 
“false sensory perception that has a compelling 
sense of reality despite the absence of an external 
stimulus. It may affect any of the senses, but auditory 
hallucinations and visual hallucinations are most 
common. Hallucinations are typically a symptom of a 
psychotic disorder, particularly schizophrenia, but 
also may result from substance use, neurological 
abnormalities, and other conditions. It is important to 
distinguish hallucinations from illusions, which are 
misinterpretations of real sensory stimuli” 
(https://dictionary.apa.org/hallucination). 
It is pretty clear, however, that virtually all 
cases of synesthesia emphatically do not involve “the 
absence of an external stimulus” if this means the 
total lack of any distal object at all.  There are no 
experiences of pink rats climbing on the wall when 
there is nothing at all on the wall.  So this tends to 
favor Sollberger’s view that synesthesia is not 
hallucinatory.  However, there is still presumably the 
absence of the property attributed to the object 
(again, the “appropriate stimulus”), at least according 
to normal perceivers.  In this respect, perhaps 
synesthesia is closer to an illusion than a 
hallucination.  O’Callaghan (14) seems to have 
something like this ambiguity in mind when he says 
that: 
“…synesthesia is not necessarily 
hallucinatory. “In many cases, synesthetes perceive 
an object but misperceive its features.  For instance, 
a synesthete might see a grapheme but misattribute 
some color to it.  Perhaps, however, this should be 
understood as involving an attribute hallucination or 
property hallucination rather than mere illusion.  This 
would require developing and appealing to an 
independently motivated conception of attribute or 
property hallucination. Nevertheless, being 
hallucinatory does not appear to suffice for being a 
case of synesthesia” (14, p. 53, fn. 13). 
In the next subsection, I will explore a view 
along these lines. 
4.1. Primary and secondary qualities of 
objects 
The above discussion leads me to consider 
how the traditional distinction between primary and 
secondary qualities of objects can shed light on the 
nature of synesthetic experience. 
Some background first: John Locke 
famously distinguished between primary and 
secondary qualities of objects (15). Primary qualities 
are those qualities that have to do with the object’s 
microstructure and, according to Locke, are 
inseparable from the external object itself, such as 
size, shape, mass, number, and motion. Secondary 
qualities, however, are those qualities which are 
“nothing in the objects in themselves but powers to 
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produce various sensations or ideas in us,” such as 
colors, tastes, and sounds.  It is only ideas of primary 
qualities of a perceptual object that really resemble 
what is in the object whereas secondary qualities are 
merely caused by the object’s microstructure. 
According to Locke’s representative realism, primary 
qualities are “really out there” mind-independently, 
especially as compared to secondary qualities which 
are mind-dependent to some extent.  Primary 
qualities would still exist without minds to perceive 
them but there would not be any secondary 
qualities.  Locke explains:  
“…I think it easy to draw this observation, 
that the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are 
resemblances of them, and their patterns do really 
exist in the bodies themselves, but the ideas 
produced in us by these secondary qualities have 
no resemblance to them at all. There is nothing like 
our ideas existing in the bodies themselves. They 
are, in the bodies we denominate from them, only 
a power to produce those sensations in us; and 
what is sweet, blue, or warm in idea is but the 
certain bulk, figure, and motion of the insensible 
parts, in the bodies themselves, which we call so” 
(15, Book II, Ch. 8, sec. 15). 
There is of course still significant debate 
today as to how best to characterize the mind-
dependence or mind-independence of secondary 
qualities (especially with respect to color).  The 
question might be framed as “What kinds of 
properties are colors?” or “Are colors mind-
independent in some sense?” For example, 
“primitivism” about colors holds that colors are 
primitive properties, that is, simple, sui generis, 
qualitative properties that physical bodies possess 
or appear to possess. A “reductive physicalist” 
holds that colors are “hidden” properties of bodies, 
that is, complex, physical properties that dispose 
bodies to look blue, pink, yellow, and so 
on. Another view is “dispositionalism” such that 
colors are perceiver-dependent, dispositional 
properties; that is, powers to look in distinctive 
ways to appropriate perceivers, in appropriate 
circumstances (16, p. 9).  Note, however, that we 
still have the problematic and ambiguous 
expressions “appropriate perceivers” and 
“appropriate circumstances.” 
Sollberger also recognizes the issue at 
hand.  He explains that:   
“Accepting that synesthetic experiences 
can be veridical will, of course, have important 
ramifications for what a metaphysical theory of color 
properties can look like. For instance, it seems to be 
immediately ruled out that colors could be construed 
as intrinsic, categorical properties of physical objects. 
Instead, it marries up more easily with a form of 
psychological-dispositionalism about color, 
according to which x’s property of having a certain 
color, such as red, is analyzed in terms of 
dispositions and powers…. In this way, grapheme-
color synesthesia can be veridical because there is 
nothing incoherent in the idea that an object can have 
the disposition to appear black and the disposition to 
appear red to the synesthete 
simultaneously…Moreover, dispositionalists can 
insist that perceiving distal objects as colored does 
not involve a kind of massive error or systemic 
illusion, for the dispositional properties can be 
grounded in the categorical bases of the objects 
themselves” (4, p. 183). 
Of course, an idealist, such as Bishop 
Berkeley, would say that even the so-called primary 
qualities are mind-dependent (at least dependent on 
God’s mind).  I do not wish to try to settle these 
disputes here.  For our purposes, let us simply 
assume that there are mind-independent objects and 
that we often do experience secondary qualities as 
properties of external objects, for example, that 
objects appear to us as colored.  Still, some 
secondary qualities seem better described as caused 
by external objects, such as the sound of a guitar 
string vibration or the smell of a specific food.   
So it makes sense that secondary qualities 
are almost always those experienced as 
concurrents.  In this way, synesthetes can have an 
intrasubjective coherent stream of conscious 
perceptions.  Since secondary qualities are at least 
not entirely mind-independent in some sense, they 
perhaps matter less to coherent conscious 
experience in the sense that one can have an 
individual and idiosyncratic way of experiencing the 
color, taste, and smell of objects. If we treat 
secondary qualities as themselves appearances of 
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objects, then concurrents are more like unusual 
appearances of objects or, perhaps even better, 
“appearances of appearances” in at least cases 
where a secondary quality inducer triggers a 
concurrent experience of another secondary quality 
(such as in sound-color, smell-touch, or sound-taste 
synesthesia). That is, we can understand many 
instances of synesthesia to involve what we might 
call “second-order secondary properties,” namely, 
the experiences of (secondary) properties or qualities 
of objects induced by the secondary qualities of those 
objects (as opposed to primary qualities).  So it is 
crucial to notice that the concurrent is virtually always 
a secondary quality of objects, such as a taste, smell, 
or color.  Although the inducer is often a secondary 
quality, it can also be a primary quality such as size, 
shape, and motion.  
Perhaps the fact that the concurrent is 
rarely a primary quality also accounts for why 
synesthesia is almost always one-directional, that is, 
synesthetes who experience an inducer-concurrent 
pair (I, C) will not experience that pair in reverse (C, 
I).  One exceptional instance is Julie Roxburgh who 
sees color when she hears sounds and hears sounds 
when she sees colors (7, pp. 102-103).  Each color 
produces a musical note.  However, as we might 
expect, this leads her to have a kind of 
psychopathology where there is sensory overload 
and she has serious problems functioning in 
everyday life, including walking and navigating 
through traffic: “The onslaught of cacophony results 
in considerable perceptual interferences and causes 
her distress” (7, p. 102).  She “feels frightened and 
exhausted… (it is) difficult to avoid traffic and people 
and to keep control…every one of her senses is 
‘being battered’… (the) neon lights are shouting 
(and)…flashing lights give her a tactile sensation in 
her fingers” (7, p. 102).  This description of her life, at 
least, certainly runs counter to Sollberger’s 
characterization of synesthesia as enhancing 
cognitive fitness and not as a disabling or 
dysfunctional biological trait.  Nonetheless, 
Sollberger may unknowingly be pointing to the 
reason why bi-directionality is so rare. 
Perhaps even more important for my 
immediate purposes is the fact that there are rarely, 
if ever, cases where there is a secondary quality 
inducer and a primary quality concurrent.  There are 
some unusual forms of synesthesia which might 
appear to fit this description, such as audio-motor 
synesthesia (7, p. 40).  However, in this case, we 
have a boy who felt compelled to move his body into 
various poses in response to the sounds of words.  It 
was not as if he experienced the motion of outer 
objects when he heard these words.  Otherwise, I 
would think that his daily life would be extremely 
difficult as a practical matter, analogous to Julie 
Roxburgh. 
It seems to me that, as long as there is 
some internal individual experiential consistency 
among experienced concurrents, there is little 
worry about incoherent and very disruptive 
experiences.  In contrast, the potential for 
disruption and difficulty successfully interacting 
with the world results (or would result) more often 
in cases where concurrents involve primary 
qualities such as size, shape, and motion.  It is true 
that some synesthetes do talk about seeing a black 
letter as, say, both black and orange which would 
seem contradictory and potentially 
disruptive.  However, these synesthetes are 
presumably not quite saying that they experience 
objects or letters as black and orange all over at 
the same time and nothing is changing in location 
or size.  Some will describe the two colors as 
though a colored transparency (e.g. orange) is 
placed on top of the black grapheme.  On the other 
hand, it would be much more difficult to understand 
what it would possibly be like, say, if a type of 
colored object appeared to be both large and 
small, or in motion and at rest, or both square and 
triangular.  Similarly, it is difficult to see how one 
could coherently experience one type of food smell 
as inducing the experience of that food moving or 
being larger than the other food on a plate.  The 
same can be said for systematically experiencing 
a type of colored object, say, moving in ways that 
other colored objects do not.  For one thing, many 
objects have more than one color.  And try to 
imagine, for example, judging the distance 
between objects.  How could one drive or play a 
sport without becoming paralyzed into 
inaction?  How could one engage in the most basic 
interactions with others? This would seem not only 
to threaten the coherence of such conscious 
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experiences but, we might say, the very unity of 
consciousness.  Further, these kinds of abnormal 
conscious experience would most certainly be 
more noticeable to others and highly debilitating to 
the people in question.   
As a matter of fact, some of the 
possibilities might even resemble some rather 
bizarre known psychopathologies.  For example, 
Alice in Wonderland Syndrome (AiWS) is a 
disorienting neuropsychological condition that 
affects object size perception (17).  People 
experience distortions in visual perception such as 
objects appearing small (micropsia), objects 
appearing large (macropsia), (objects appearing to 
be closer than they are (pelopsia), or objects 
appearing to be further away than they are 
(teleopsia).  Size distortion may occur with the 
other senses as well.  AiWS is often associated 
with severe migraines, brain tumors, and 
psychoactive drug use.  AiWS can be caused by 
abnormal amounts of electrical activity resulting in 
abnormal blood flow in the parts of the 
brain.  Although this condition is more often found 
in young people and often clears up on its own, it 
is clear that AiWS has a negative impact one’s 
everyday life. 
Let us explore another psychopathology 
sometimes discussed in connection with 
synesthesia. 
5. SYNESTHESIA AND AUTISM 
There has been significant discussion of 
the relationship between synesthesia and autism. 
Autism is a disorder characterized by impaired 
social interaction and communication, and by 
restricted and repetitive behavior. It is a 
developmental disorder that affects a child’s ability 
to develop social skills and engage in social 
activities. It is sometimes thought of as coming in 
varying degrees and thus called Autism Spectrum 
Disorder (ASD). Researchers largely agree that 
autistic persons have impaired empathizing skills 
and deception detection. There is typically a lack 
of normal eye contact and gaze monitoring along 
with a lack of normal social awareness and 
responsiveness, such as would normally occur 
when one is embarrassed (18).  There are two 
main points of contact between autism and 
synesthesia that I will address here: 
5.1. Neural connectivity 
Autism and synesthesia seem to be in 
opposition with regard to neural connectivity (19, 7, 
pp. 241-245).  Recall that there is some evidence for 
neural “hyperconnectivity” in synesthetes, that is, a 
“cross-activation” or “cross-wiring” of adjacent brain 
regions (1). For example, the parietal cortex 
especially has been found to be hyperactivated in 
different types of synesthesia, which also suggests 
the idea of top-down modulation of sensory areas by 
this higher-order associative region (9). 
It has been observed that those with autism 
seem to have the reverse condition, that is, 
decreased neural connectivity in certain brain 
areas.  Cytowic and Eagleman explain that “it is 
enticing to consider (autism’s) opposite nature from 
synesthesia. Neural cross talk is reduced in autism 
but increased in synesthesia” (and) “autistics are less 
likely to be fooled by certain illusions…less 
susceptible to visually induced motion” (7, p. 
242).  Hirstein also argues independently that some 
recent evidence points to widespread 
underconnectivity in autistic brains (19).   
The matter is not so simple, 
however.  Hirstein also points out that this lack of 
frontal connectivity appears to be accompanied by 
increased local connectivity in the posterior cortex. 
He explains that “Monk et al. found increased 
connectivity between the posterior cingulate cortex 
and temporal regions in subjects with autism. In 
addition, they found that increased repetitive 
behaviors, a core diagnostic symptom of autism, 
were associated with increased connectivity 
between the posterior cingulate cortex and the 
parahippocampal gyrus” (19, p. 254; 20).  It is also 
worth noting that Baron-Cohen and colleagues 
published a case study on a rather unusual man, 
Daniel Tammet, with synesthesia, autism, and 
savantism (21, 22). They suggested that co-
occurrence of ASD and synesthesia might 
increase the likelihood of savantism but there is 
also evidence for a link between ASD and 
Synesthesia, Hallucination, and Autism 
805 © 1996-2021 
 
synesthesia, which is perhaps further support for 
the notion that synesthesia can benefit those who 
have synesthesia. 
5.2. The perceptual-conceptual divide 
Adams and Shreve have argued that both 
synesthesia and autism are potential problems for 
the view that perceptual states have conceptual 
content as well as for the higher-order thought (HOT) 
theory of consciousness (23, 24, 25, 26).  They focus 
on what we might call “the perceptual-conceptual 
divide.” 
For those unfamiliar with the higher-order 
thought (HOT) theory, it says that what makes a 
mental state M a conscious mental state is that 
there is a HOT to the effect that “I am in mental 
state M.”  One question that should be answered 
by any theory of consciousness is: What makes a 
mental state a conscious mental state? So, for 
example, my desire to drink some water becomes 
conscious when I am (non-inferentially) “aware” of 
the desire. Intuitively, it seems that conscious 
states, as opposed to unconscious ones, are 
mental states that I am “aware of” being in some 
sense. For various reasons, HOT theorists believe 
that it is best to construe such “meta-awareness” 
as thoughts constituted by concepts.  Conversely, 
the idea that I could be having a conscious state 
while totally unaware of being in that state seems 
odd or perhaps even contradictory. A mental state 
of which the subject is completely unaware is 
clearly an unconscious state. For example, I would 
not be aware of having a subliminal perception and 
thus it is an unconscious perception. HOTs, since 
they are thoughts after all, are constituted by 
concepts.  It is worth noting also that when a 
conscious mental state is a first-order world-
directed state the higher-order thought (HOT) is 
not itself conscious. When the HOT is itself 
conscious, there is a yet higher-order (or third-
order) thought directed at the second-order state. 
In this case, we have introspection which involves 
a conscious HOT directed at an inner mental state. 
When one introspects, one’s attention is directed 
back into one's mind. 
So Adams and Shreve first explain that:  
“Ramachandran was thoroughly 
investigating as many ways as he and his 
researchers could think of to test whether 
(grapheme-color synesthesia) was conceptual (or 
‘top-down’) vs. perceptual (not driven by conceptual 
association or deployment) (23). In a ‘pop-out’ 
experiment, Ramachandran produced a grid of 5s 
and 2s that were mirror images of one another (27). 
The grid was presented for about one half second. To 
a non-synesthete, looking at the grid produced only 
the experience of random figures. The subjects had 
to press one of two buttons on a computer depending 
upon whether they saw a triangle or a circle….Twenty 
‘normal’ subjects scored about 50% on whether the 
shapes were circles or triangles….However, when 
subjects with synesthesia looked at the grid, the 
colors that they saw on the numbers caused the 
shapes to pop out. That is, the 2s were arranged 
either in a circular pattern or a triangular pattern 
among the 5s (which were randomly placed). The 
colors seen when observing the 2s and their shapes 
in circular or triangular pattern were apparent to them 
at a hit rate of 80-90%. For example, a pattern of 2s 
that was triangular jumped out as a red 
triangle….The subjects with synesthesia 
experienced something the subjects without 
synesthesia did not. The reason this is interesting in 
regard to HOT theories, is that the ‘popout’ 
phenomena is a bottom-up visual experience. The 
subjects did not first see the shape (triangle or circle) 
and then have the higher-order thought (‘triangle’ or 
‘circle’) causing the experience of the shape to 
become conscious.  Rather, the perceptual pop-out 
produced the conscious visual experience of the 
shape prior to the having of the thought about the 
shape experienced” (23, pp. 253-254). 
The experimental results themselves are 
uncontroversial since it seems rather well established 
that they show the popout experience is very real to 
synesthetes.  Still, it can be argued that HOT theory 
does have the resources to account for synesthesia 
and the specific worries that they advance in their 
paper, such as the relationship between concepts 
and experience and the ability to explain instances of 
“pop-out” experiences (28, 29).  Recall from section 
one that there are so-called “higher” and “lower” 
synesthetes in grapheme-color synesthesia (1, 
7).  Notably, lower synesthesia is rare.  Adams and 
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Shreve seem to have ignored the prevalence of 
higher synesthesia which explicitly involves the 
“meaning” or “concept” of the grapheme (23).  It is the 
meaning of the grapheme that induces color, not the 
visual shape itself.  Letter capitalization and font size 
generally do not change an induced color.  For 
example, J, j, and J evoke the same color 
experience.  Much the same goes for numbers and 
number concepts, that is, higher synesthetes 
experience the same color (e.g. blue) when seeing 
both the Arabic numeral ‘5’ and the Roman numeral 
‘V.’  More generally, the claim might be framed as the 
view that “conscious perceptual experiences can 
represent objects as falling into fairly abstract 
conceptual categories” (22, p. 152).  The matter is 
even more complicated, for example, some 
grapheme-color synesthetes may have different color 
experiences when seeing a “5” as opposed to seeing 
numerous “2’s” arranged in the shape of a “5.” 
Although HOTs, with their constituent concepts, are 
necessary for conscious states, the evidence here 
also seems to indicate that a conceptual component 
is intimately involved in these synesthetic 
experiences.  This concept application itself can of 
course also occur unconsciously and almost 
instantaneously.  The conscious experience of the 
colored number need not occur prior to the HOT and 
concept application. 
The idea that concepts and cognitive states 
can affect one’s very perceptual experiences is more 
recently referred to as “cognitive penetration” (30, 31, 
32) which also seems supported by the 
neuroscientific evidence on synesthesia.  Recall 
again our discussion of “disinhibited cortical 
feedback” between brain areas such that information 
is processed in a bottom-up fashion but also that later 
stage brain activation feeds back to activate earlier 
stages. It is this abnormal feedback that causes these 
unusual synesthetic experiences (6).  In addition, 
Cytowic and Eagleman explain that, for higher 
synesthetes, V4 cross-activiates with the anterior 
inferior temporal (AIT) cortex which processes 
conceptual representations of words, letters, and 
numbers (7).  Further, it seems that semantic 
memory can affect sensory perceptions (33).   
Thus, I disagree with Adams and Shreve 
when they suppose that thoughts, unlike 
experiences, involve concepts.  Perceptual 
experiences are not concept-free. With regard to 
synesthesia, then, it seems to me that their either/or 
question presents a false dichotomy: is “synesthesia 
a conceptual or perceptual phenomenon?” (23, p. 
253).  My own view is that such experiences are both 
conceptual and perceptual as is the case with all 
conscious experience (26). 
Regarding autism, Adams and Shreve say 
that:  
“subjects with severe forms of autism are 
susceptible to pop-out synesthesia of the kind that we 
described in our initial paper (24, 23). Now a hallmark 
of severe autism is what Baron-Cohen called ‘mind-
blindness (18).’ This is the inability to apply mental 
concepts to self or others. People with severe autism 
have no trouble understanding people as physical 
systems with physical properties…But when it comes 
to beliefs, desires, intentions, hopes, fears, wishes 
and other mental causes, severely autistic individuals 
simply do not understand behavior originating from 
these causes. Such purposive behavior is a complete 
mystery to them. Thus, they do not engage in 
applying mental concepts to themselves or others. 
Consequently, when a person with severe autism 
consciously experiences the pop-out of synesthesia, 
it cannot be the result of applying an HOT to their 
experience because they don’t employ HOTs about 
mental states (of self or others)” (24, p. 133). 
But the ‘mind-blind’ characterization of 
autism, even in the more severe cases, is mistaken 
or at least greatly exaggerated. It is not at all clear 
that autistic people cannot have or apply any mental 
concepts to themselves or others (26, 28).  One 
problem with the autism literature is that some 
authors who argue for a deficiency in ‘self-
consciousness’ among autistic individuals leave the 
term undefined.  This is important especially since it 
seems that self-consciousness, self-concepts, I-
thoughts, concept possession, and so on can come 
in degrees. At the most sophisticated level, there is 
introspection or reflection. Even if there are 
deficiencies in introspection, it does not follow that 
there are no I-thoughts or metacognitive states at 
all.  It is one thing to suppose that autistic people 
have abnormal or impaired self-consciousness, but 
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quite another to claim that there is no self-
consciousness at all. Indeed, despite their own 
skepticism regarding autistic self-consciousness, 
Frith and Happé themselves quote numerous cases 
of first-person reports from autistic people (34, pp. 
11-14). 
6. CONCLUSION 
I have engaged critically with Sollberger’s 
view that there is reason to think that at least some 
synesthetic experiences can be viewed as truly 
veridical perceptions, and not as illusions or 
hallucinations.  With the help of the traditional 
Lockean primary-secondary quality distinction, I 
explored the possibility that many forms of 
synesthesia can be understood as experiencing what 
I will call “second-order secondary properties,” that is, 
experiences of properties or qualities of objects 
induced by the secondary qualities of those 
objects.  Depending on the definition of hallucination, 
it may be that some synesthetic experiences are 
hallucinatory in at least some sense.  In the process, 
I have also attempted to shed light on why 
synesthesia is virtually always one-directional, that is, 
the greater potential for difficulty successfully 
interacting with the world where concurrents involve 
primary qualities such as size, shape, and 
motion.  Finally, I briefly addressed synesthesia’s 
relation to autism partly based on evidence regarding 
neural connectivity and the conceptual component of 
some synesthetic experiences.  
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